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Can and Immortal: The Difference between Mencius and Xun on Moral Actions
Author: Liao Xiaoying Zhu Yanling
Source: Author Author Authorized by Confucian Network, Originally published by “China Science and Technology Major” (Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 2022 Issue 5
Abstract: Xunzi’s “Natural Abuse” is a chapter that opposes Mencius’s goodness in nature, and specifically proposes the distinction between “can” and “can”. In fact, when Mencius discussed the problem of moral reality, he was sure to apply “can” equally to “can”. Refer to Kant’s Ethics “should be shouInclusive message boardContaining energy” The basic principle of Mencius’s good nature is the following explanation of moral actions: moral responses not only define the physical ability of a person to complete the required actions in the world of experience; at the same time, as moral actions, the four-terminal hearts have acquired talents who directly grasp the appropriateness and stand in the rational desire to see and determine the main intention according to the appropriate request, that is, confidants and good abilities. But for Xunzi, although people have the quality of knowing good and being good, they still lack the will to truly know good and determine people’s subjective intentions by seeking good. Only by teaching and guiding the law of the acquired masters can these acquired conditions be transformed into subjective talents that are sufficient to ensure that moral actions have real ability. This can be said to be the most basic disagreement between Meng and Xun in moral philosophy. The explanation of the differences between Meng and Xun on moral actions is also the two most important examples of traditional Confucianism’s knowledge of action.
Keywords: yes; able; moral behavior; Mencius; Xunzi;
Author profile: Liao Xiaoying, associate professor of the School of Philosophy of China Science and Technology; Zhu Yanling, Hubei Provincial SocietyInnovation and Refining the Situation Assistant Research Office of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences;
In recent years, the differences between Meng and Xun’s philosophy and their ideological connections have become a focus of debate in the academic community. From the perspective of Xunzi’s humanitarian theory and his philosophy have been continuously emerging, and many trial works by Meng and Xun’s Philosophy have appeared. There are similar trends in the English community. When discussing the problem of the transformation of the movement and humanity in Xunzi’s philosophy, some students especially emphasize that Xunzi also acknowledges the importance of some acquired feelings in humanity. These feelings can establish a certain internal connection with the moral tree. This not only made Xunzi’s humanitarian theory appear internal contradictions[1], but it undoubtedly greatly narrowed the distance between thinking between Meng and Xun. The difference between Meng and Xun’s philosophy has become a need to be explained from the beginning.Questions of In fact, behind the above discussion, there is a large distance between the reality of Mencius’s nature and Xunzi’s understanding of Mencius’s nature and the understanding of Mencius’ nature and the understanding of Mencius’ nature and the relationship between them. This article attempts to separate the differences and essence between Mencius and Xun’s philosophy from the distinction between “can” and “can” that Xunzi specifically proposed to criticize Mencius’s good nature.
1. Can and can: Xunzi’s criticism of Mencius
Intellectual As pointed out by a scholar, the division between “can” and “can” in the “Xunzi: Nature Abuse” is essentially a criticism and response to Mencius’s application of “can” and “can” in the field of morality [2][3]. However, the division between “can” and “can” is divided into the theoretical meanings of reading the philosophical sects of Meng and Xun, and there is still a space for further discussion. The division between “can” and “can” has an internal theory related to another division in the “Natural Abuse” chapter: “from nature” and “from evil”. These two areas are divided into Xunzi’s understanding of the abilities and conditions of (morality) actions. In Xunzi’s view, the nature of the movement of a body can be divided into two categories: the person out of the nature and the person out of the sick. In particular, “out of nature” means that the conditions that can be sufficient for action are determined by humanity. “The eyes are lustful, the ears are good, the mouth is good, the bones and skin are good and pleasant” are all of them. The expression of this rational life activity has the characteristics of “sensation and naturalness, and it will be born without waiting for anything.” “For those who are sick” means that the ability conditions of actions must include acquired humans. This type of actions includes various professional skills, moral integrity, etc. Their essential characteristics are: “If you feel but cannot be done, you must wait for things to go.” In Xunzi’s view, the most basic error in Mencius’s saying that nature is good lies in his failure to correctly understand the theoretical meaning of “for those who are nature” and “for those who are sick” [1]. Because if one takes the good nature and uses nature to explain goodness, all acquired reasons will be erased. Therefore, Xunzi doubts: “Now, do you have to use the nature of a person to consolidate the truth and calmly cure evil? If there is a bad use of the sage king, it is a bad use of the sage king, and it is a bad use of the gift!” (Xunzi·Nature of a bad person) In other words, Xunzi believed that Mencius’ explanation of moral behavior was complete and incompatible with the true experience of human life, because the education of the sage king, the norms and guidance of the gift are the main conditions that people can do in reality for good.
But this never seems to be that good and completeness are only the result of acquired reasons. Some acquired talents are essential conditions for people to achieve good and virtue. This is why Xunzi proposed the division between “can” and “can”: “The person who Tu can be Yu”, how can he say? He said: “Any reason why Yu is Yu is because he is the right way of benevolence and righteous law, but there is a principle that can be known and perfect. However, people who Tu have all the quality of benevolence and righteous law, and they all have the tools to be able to be benevolence and righteous law, but they can be clear about Yu.”… Therefore, sages are what people use to achieve. … Therefore, the person who Tu can be Yu, but the person who Tu can be Yu may not be Yu.It is concentration. Even if you cannot be as good as Yu, you can be as good as Yu. It is enough to travel across the country, but there is no one who can travel across the country. Craftsmen cannot do things without being able to do things together, but they cannot do things together. If you use this view, it can be done, but it may not be possible; even if it cannot be done, it can be done without harm. However, if one cannot achieve the difference between the two things that cannot be achieved, the differences are far behind, and if one cannot achieve the difference, it is clear that the relationship is not achieved. (Xunzi·Nature and evil)
According to Xunzi, all the innate knowledge of benevolence and righteousness and ability to benevolence and righteousness are acquired conditions that can be acquired for good and virtue, but only this lack is to fully explain why people can be good in reality. Therefore, these conditions are only necessary rather than sufficient. As long as these acquired conditions or potential talents are transformed into real abilities that can fully explain the character and actions of a person. This is the transformation from “can” to “can”, and the key to contacting the two is the acquired human efforts, which is what Xunzi calls “swallowing”. From the above, we can see that the difference between “out of nature” and “out of disgust” actually implies the division between “can” and “energy”, precisely because of the grand drought between “can” and “energy”, the human departmental actions cannot be fully understood to “out of nature”, so we have to use “out of disgust” to illustrate its practical ability. In terms of certain meaning, we can say that the Han Confucian Dong Zhongshu used the “metaphor of wheat and rice” to illustrate the relationship between nature and atmosphere, and criticized Mencius’s nature goodness, which is based on the distinction between Xunzi’s “can” and “can”.
As mentioned in the previous article, Xunzi criticized Mencius’ key in “Natural Abuse” chapter, that is, he doubted that he “was not as good as knowing the nature of a person, but not observing the distinction between nature and nature”, that is, he failed to accurately distinguish “from nature” and “from nature”. The key to mistakenly considering &#
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